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The Law of China’s Local Government Debt Crisis:
Local Government Financing Vehicles and Their Bonds
Draft date: June 5, 2016
Donald Clarke
Fang Lu
Abstract
Local government financing vehicles (“LGFVs”)—companies capitalized and owned by local
government and established for the purpose of raising funds for municipal infrastructure
construction—emerged in China in the 1980s as a response to the severe constraints on
indebtedness by local governments themselves. The mushrooming of their number and
indebtedness has sparked fears about their ability to repay the debt and the consequences of a
default. In addition to taking on bank debt, a number of LGFVs have also issued bonds. While
observers have questioned the value of collateral typically offered as security for the bonds, we
know of no extensive analysis to date of the legal quality of the collateral: what exactly are the
bondholders being promised, and what is the status of those promises in the Chinese legal
system? This article is an attempt to answer that question, using data from two hand-collected
samples of LGFV bond prospectuses from different regions in China in two different time
periods.
We find that current collateralization practices vary a great deal across bond issues and have
changed over time, and discuss the legal and other problems attendant upon each type of backup.
Remarkably, we find that unlike our initial sample of bond issues, recent bond issues virtually
all state explicitly in the prospectus that they carry no security. Thus, the popular image of local
governments wildly overpromising with guarantees they are not legally empowered to give
seems, at least as far as recent bond issues are concerned, to be wholly wrong. This in turn calls
into question the figures commonly provided for local government debt, since they often
include LGFV debt that local government is neither legally nor morally obligated to pay. To be
sure, they may wish to pay creditors voluntarily, but it is misleading to label as “debt” soft
obligations of this nature. Creditors who have tried to force local governments to make good
on their guarantees have uniformly failed, at most receiving half of what they sought. The
argument that local governments have some politically enforceable obligation to pay on their
guarantees does not seem supported by the evidence.
Keywords: China, local government, government debt, government bonds, local government
financing vehicles, secured transactions
JEL classifications: K20, K22, K23, K40

THE LAW OF CHINA’S LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT CRISIS:
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING VEHICLES AND THEIR BONDS
Draft date: June 5, 2016
Donald Clarke*
Fang Lu**

1. Introduction
Local government financing vehicles (“LGFVs”)—that is, companies capitalized and
owned by local government1 and established for the purpose of raising funds for municipal
infrastructure construction—emerged in China in the 1980s as a response to the severe
constraints on indebtedness by local governments themselves.2 In the last several years, their
number and indebtedness has mushroomed, sparking fears about their ability to repay the
debt and the consequences of a default. In addition to taking on bank debt, a number of
LGFVs have also issued bonds, something generally prohibited to local governments. While
observers have justifiably questioned the economic value of land and other collateral
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In this article, “local government” refers to a government one or more administrative levels
below the central government—for example, a city, county, or provincial government. The
term is used interchangeably with “sub-national government” or “SNG”.
2

On local government debt in China generally, see Xun Wu, China's Growing Local
Government Debt Levels, MIT CENTER FOR FINANCE AND POLICY (January 2016), available
at http://bit.ly/xunwu.
1

typically offered as security for the bonds,3 we know of no extensive analysis to date of the
legal quality of the collateral: what exactly are the bondholders being promised, and what is
the status of those promises in the Chinese legal system? This article is an attempt to answer
that question.
The primary data for this study comes from two hand-collected samples of LGFV bond
prospectuses from different regions in China in two different time periods.4 Group I consists
of nineteen issues from 2009 to 2011, and Group II consists of twenty issues from 2014. The
prospectuses in Group 1 were selected with a view to understanding the picture in various
parts of the country, but were not selected on the basis of the repayment safeguards offered.
The Group II prospectuses were selected entirely randomly from a large group of 2014 bond
issues.
We begin with a brief overview of the Chinese LGFV financing landscape. We then
discuss in detail the main categories of backup5 for the bondholders. We find that current
collateralization practices vary a great deal across bond issues and have changed over time.
The three main ways—typically alternative and not additive—in which bonds are backed up
are land use rights, local government guarantees, and guarantees from third-party companies.
Some bond issues are explicitly not backed up by anything other than the issuer’s own assets.
We discuss the legal and other problems attendant upon each type of backup. Remarkably, we
find that unlike our initial sample of bond issues, recent bond issues virtually all state

3

See, e.g., China Cities Value Land at Winnetka Prices with Bonds Seen Toxic, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (July 13, 2011, 12:01 PM), http://bloom.bg/q0AV7P (hereinafter China Cities).
4

The prospectuses are listed in the Appendix. For ease of reference, the prospectus for any
particular issue shall be referred to in this article using the abbreviation provided in the
Appendix.
5

We use this term deliberately in order to avoid the more narrow and technical connotations
of “collateral”. Whether the proper steps to achieve collateralization have actually been taken
is sometimes not clear.
2

explicitly in the prospectus that they carry no security. Thus, the popular image of local
governments wildly overpromising with guarantees they are not legally empowered to give
seems, at least as far as recent bond issues are concerned, to be wholly wrong. This in turn
calls into question the figures commonly provided for local government debt, since they often
include LGFV debt which, as we shall show, local government is neither legally nor morally
obligated to pay.
It may turn out that handwringing over LGFV debt is no longer necessary. In 2015, a new
Budget Law came into effect that promised to regularize the issue of bonds by provinciallevel governments, and in the spring of 2015 the Chinese government announced a plan
whereby LGFV debt would be replaced by bonds issued by provincial-level governments.6
These policies have the potential to fundamentally change the regime described here; if the
swap is completed, for example, many of the issues raised here would essentially be finessed
away. Nevertheless, even if the swap is successful, we believe that the legal issues involved
in LGFV debt are very likely to reappear at another time in another context, and therefore are
still worth exploring and clarifying. In particular, it is important to clarify the legal picture in
order to assess the government’s response now and its likely response in similar situations in
the future.
2. Municipal government financing and LGFVs
a. Municipal finance generally

6

See Du Tao (杜涛), Caizheng Bu Pifu 3 Wan Yi Edu Zhihuan Cunliang Zhaiwu 1 Wan Yi Yi
Xiapi Gesheng (财政部批复 3 万亿额度置换存量债务 1 万亿已下批各省) [Ministry of
Finance Approves 3 Trillion Quota in Bonds-for-Debt Swap; 1 Trillion Already Allocated to
Provinces], JINGJI GUANCHA WANG (经济观察网) [ECONOMIC OBSERVER NETWORK] (March
6, 2015, 9:07 AM), http://www.eeo.com.cn/2015/0306/273066.shtml; Defusing a Bomb, THE
ECONOMIST (March 11, 2015, 3:44 PM), http://econ.st/1HIAuDX. For a more detailed
discussion, see infra Part 4.
3

LGFVs arose as a response to an irresistible force and an immovable object. The
irresistible force was the heavy responsibility of local governments for the provision of
services, a responsibility often unfunded by the central government. The immovable object
was the inability of local governments to raise money through taxation or borrowing: local
governments are not allowed to run budget deficits and may not generally issue bonds.7 The
result has been the toleration—and during the financial crisis, the encouragement—of
backdoor practices that permit sub-national governments (SNGs) to meet their spending
responsibilities.
i. Responsibility for provision of services
Municipal governments in China are responsible for a vast array of government
expenditures, including all vital services and infrastructure. Although China is formally a
unitary state, in 2008,8 for example, central government expenditures were just 21% of
national budgetary expenditures.9 By contrast, even federal states such as Canada and the
United States exhibit much higher percentages: 43% (in 2002) and 51% (in 1999)
respectively.10
At the same time, the intergovernmental financial system is weak. SNGs suffer large
vertical fiscal gaps—that is, a mismatch between assigned tax revenues and assigned
expenditures. For example, in 2008, SNGs were responsible for 79% of government

7

See infra Part 2.a.ii.2.b.

8

We will frequently provide statistics for the late 2000s because this is when LGFV activity
took off.
9

See Wei Cui, Fiscal Federalism in Chinese Taxation, 3 WORLD TAX J. 455, 456 (2011). The
figure for 2009 is 20%. See Christine Wong, Paying for Urbanization in China: Challenges
of Municipal Finance in the 21st Century, in FINANCING METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENTS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 273, 281 (Roy W. Bahl et al. ed., 2012).
10

See Cui, supra note 9, at 456.
4

expenditures, but were directly allocated only 43% of tax revenues.11 The remaining
expenditures must be met from intergovernmental transfers and non-tax sources of revenue,
and transfers are inadequate.12
ii. Restrictions on revenue-raising
In spite of their considerable responsibilities, municipal governments and SNGs
generally suffer considerable restrictions on their revenue-raising abilities.
1. Restrictions on taxing power
SNGs cannot meet financial needs simply by imposing new taxes at will. Nevertheless,
the often-heard assertion that local governments in China have no taxing power needs to be
qualified. It is true that both the 1992 Law on the Administration of Tax Collection13 and a
1993 decision of the State Council14—the decision that was the core of the key 1994 tax
system reform—purport to grant exclusive authority over taxes to the central government.
But the rules contained in these documents have not been strictly adhered to by the central
authorities themselves, and local governments have consistently maintained the power in

11

See id. at 457. Similar numbers are cited in the more recent Houze Song, Why China Can
Avoid a Local Fiscal Crisis, PAULSON INSTITUTE (May 4, 2015), available at
http://bit.ly/1Q24q28. Looked at another way, local government revenue is 20% of GDP,
while local government expenditures are 28% of GDP. See China's Regional Financial
Crisis, THE BANKER, Feb. 1, 2016.
12

See Wong, supra note 9, at 7; Cui, supra note 9, at 456-57.
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Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shuishou Zhengshou Guanli Fa (中华人民共和国税收征
收管理法) [The Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Administration of
Tax Collection] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 4, 1992,
effective Jan. 1, 1993), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=95764 (China).

14

Guowuyuan Guanyu Shixing Fenshuizhi Caizheng Guanli Tizhi de Jueding (国务院关于
实行分税制财政管理体制的决定) [Decision of the State Council Regarding the
Implementation of the Tax Sharing Fiscal Administration System] (promulgated by the St.
Council, Dec. 15, 1993, effective Dec. 15, 1993), http://www.lawlib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=57216 (China).
5

practice to reduce effective tax rates through measures such as rebates.15 In the words of a
leading scholar of the Chinese tax system, these and other facts
cast doubt on whether the centralization of tax legislative power is indeed a fundamental
normative principle for Chinese law and policy, and whether it is not instead, as a more skeptical
view would hold, a mere slogan wielded by the central government as a non-neutral party in
political contests.

. . . [F]iscal federalism in taxation in China is still very much in an unsettled

state, and does not represent a coherent model.16

As a legal matter, therefore, it is not completely clear that SNGs, at least in the form of
People’s Congresses17 at the level of the province and certain cities, cannot impose (in
substance or in effect) new taxes. As a political matter, on the other hand, it is clear that the
central government almost always disfavors local imposition of new taxes, and in practice
SNGs have not been imposing new taxes as a response even to severe financial pressures.
Moreover, the center’s share of tax revenue, after subtracting revenue collected by the center
and then returned to provinces, has been steadily increasing since the 1994 tax reform: from
21.2% in 1994 to 46.1% in 2014.18

15

See generally Cui, supra note 9, at 463-65.

16

Id. at 457.

17

People’s Congresses are legislative bodies that exist at various levels of government. They
appoint the leadership of, and are formally higher in rank than, the so-called “People’s
Governments” at the same administrative level, which can be roughly analogized to an
executive branch of government.

18

See Cui, supra note 9, at 469 & n.85; Lou Jiwei (楼继伟), Guowuyuan Guanyu 2014 Nian
Zhongyang Juesuan de Baogao (国务院关于 2014 年中央决算的报告) [Report of the State
Council on the Implementation of Budget and Final Accounts of Central and Local
Governments], ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO CAIZHENG BU (中华人民共和国财政部)
[MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (June 28, 2015), available at
http://bit.ly/1ErM35g.
6

2. Restrictions on ability to borrow
SNGs are severely restricted in their ability to borrow from sources other than superior
levels of government, who may not be willing to lend. It is not always clear, however, what
the various prohibitions actually mean within the Chinese legal system. They might mean that
the prohibited debt is legally void and unenforceable, like a contract entered into by a minor.
The prohibited party is simply incapable of entering into a binding debt agreement. But a
prohibition could instead mean that the legal system recognizes the validity of the debt, but
that the governmental body or particular officials responsible for incurring it are subject to
some kind of administrative or other sanction.19 If the legal system did not recognize the
validity of the debt, the punished misbehavior could not occur.
a. Bank debt
Governmental units in China have limited legal authority to borrow from banks. It is
commonly said that SNGs are forbidden to borrow from banks,20 and there is some legal
basis for this claim. The 1996 Lending Principles issued by the People’s Bank of China, at
that time the bank regulator, forbid lending to entities other than natural persons with legal
capacity or enterprise legal persons, other economic organizations, or individual industrialcommercial households, in each case properly registered with the State Administration of

19

A legal system does this kind of thing when it enforces against a principal a contract
entered into by an agent that exceeds the scope of the agent’s authority. The contract is valid
as between the principal and the third party, but the principal can sue the agent for any losses.
20

See, e.g., Ye Peirong (叶裴荣), Woguo Difang Zhengfu Rongzi Tixi Yanjiu (我国地方政府
融资体系研究) [A Study of The Local Government Financing System in China), XINAN
JINRONG (西南金融) [SOUTHWEST FIN.], no. 1, 2012, at 39 (citing Daikuan Tongze (贷款通
则) [General Rules for Loans] (promulgated by PBOC, June 28, 1996, effective June 28,
1996), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=15263 (China) (hereinafter PBOC
Lending Principles)); China Said To Warn Banks as Local Officials Seek New Loans,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 13, 2011, 12:01 PM), http://bloom.bg/1VppWAI; MICHAEL F.
MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42380, CHINA’S BANKING SYSTEM: ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS (2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42380.pdf.
7

Industry and Commerce.21 This list of permissible borrowers does not include governmental
units, and so has been interpreted by some as banning loans to them.22 Note, however, that
the Lending Principles can be viewed as a kind of internal directive within the banking
system. Thus, it does not necessarily make loans to governmental units invalid, except
perhaps via an argument that the borrower knew or should have known that the lender had no
authority to lend.
While the PBOC Lending Principles are at least arguably a lender-side prohibition, the
Budget Law (in both the original 1994 version and its new 2015 version) has what can also
be viewed as a borrower-side prohibition. Local governments are required to balance their
budgets; they may not have deficits, and they are specifically forbidden to issue bonds absent
authorization by statute or the State Council.23 Since the preceding article in the Budget Law
specifically provides for the conditions under which the central government may take loans, it
is reasonable to infer that, at least as far as the Budget Law is concerned, local governments
may not do so under any conditions.

21

See PBOC Lending Principles, supra note 20, art. 17.

22

See, e.g., Ye, supra note 20, at 39. The author is described as an employee at the Chengdu
branch of the China Development Bank, a wholly state-owned “policy bank,” and
presumably speaks with some knowledge of actual practice within the banking industry. The
same reasoning is cited by Liang Weihong (梁卫洪), Difang Zhengfu Huandai Chengnuo de
Falü Wenti Yanjiu (地方政府还贷承诺的法律问题研究) [Research on the Legal Issues in
Local Government’s Promise to Repay Loans] (April 20, 2005) (unpublished LL.M. thesis,
Jinan (暨南) University), as the reason for setting up LGFVs as loan recipients.

23

This was true under Article 28 of the old Budget Law and remains true under Article 35 of
the recently revised Budget Law of 2015. See Yusuan Fa (预算法) [Budget Law of China]
(promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 22, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995),
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=10301 (China) (hereinafter 1994 Budget Law);
Yusuan Fa (预算法) [Budget Law of China] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 22,
1994, amended Aug. 31, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015),
http://www.jxss.net.cn/system/2016/01/13/014615259.shtml (China) (hereinafter 2015
Budget Law).
8

On the other hand, Articles 55 and 73 of the 1994 Budget Law clearly contemplate that
borrowing could be a legitimate part of a SNG budget—although interestingly their
corresponding articles in the 2015 Budget Law (articles 70 and 92) do not. Moreover, official
documents and reports appear to confirm that SNGs do borrow directly from banks.24 An
important and widely-cited 2011 National Audit Office (NAO) report on local government
debt explicitly distinguished LGFV debt from debt borrowed and owed directly by local
governments, and found the latter to be substantial25 (but also unlawful).26
Whether bank debt is viewed as lawfully or unlawfully incurred, however, commentators
appear to be unanimous that the obligation is legally valid. It is not, for example, similar to
gambling debts or an obligation to pay usurious interest rates, both of which are
unenforceable in some jurisdictions. The constant stream of government documents sternly
warning local governments not to incur debt illegally is evidence of this.27 If the obligation
were invalid, there would be no need to be concerned about local governments incurring it.
At least in theory, the government could effectively eliminate all unlawful local
government debt incurrence by simply making it known that creditors’ rights against local

24

In reading the relevant literature, it is critical to distinguish references to direct SNG
borrowing and SNG borrowing through LGFVs. The latter is often carelessly referred to as
SNG debt.

25

See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO SHENJI SHU (中华人民共和国审计署) [NATIONAL
AUDIT OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], QUANGUO DIFANG ZHENGFUXING
ZHAIWU SHENJI JIEGUO (全国地方政府性债务审计结果) [RESULTS OF NATIONWIDE AUDIT
OF GOVERNMENT DEBT], Table 3 (2011) (on file with author) (hereinafter NAO 2011).
26

See id. Sec. 3.1.

27

See, e.g., Caizheng Bu Guanyu Guifan Difang Geji Zhengfu Bumen Juzhai he Danbao
Chengnuo Xingwei de Tongzhi (财政部关于规范地方各级政府部门举债和担保承诺行为
的通知) [Notice of the Ministry of Finance on Regulating the Borrowing and Guaranteeing
of Local Governments at All Levels] (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin., Sept. 2, 2010,
effective Sept. 2, 2010), http://bit.ly/1K9ZOEO (China) (hereinafter Ministry of Finance
2010). This document cannot be interpreted as a warning to creditors that their rights will not
be upheld, since it is labeled “not for public circulation” and was distributed only to potential
debtors (local governments) and not to potential creditors (the banking system).
9

governments per se28 would not be enforced and their money would be lost, and following
up with appropriate court action (or more likely, inaction). Unlawful lending would dry up
immediately. Why the government has not adopted this policy option is not clear. There may
be practical considerations of which we are not aware that vitiate the theoretical outcome. On
the other hand, a recent Supreme People’s Court case suggests that the government may have
decided to signal that it will pursue precisely this policy.29
b. Bonds
Local governments were specifically forbidden under the 1994 Budget Law to issue
bonds except as permitted by statute or the State Council.30 As bond issues are highly visible,
this prohibition was generally effective. Nevertheless, one local government—that of
Qingyang District in Chengdu, Sichuan—managed astonishingly to issue bonds for 375
million yuan over ten years, from 1992 to 2002, before the violation was discovered by the
Ministry of Finance and shut down.31 Only in 2011 did the State Council first provide the

28

Note that we are not speaking here of creditors’ rights against financing vehicles
established by local governments, which are the focus of this paper.
29

See our discussion of the Bank of China case below at note 126 and accompanying text.

30

See 1994 Budget Law, supra note 23, art. 28 (“The local budgets at various levels shall be
compiled according to the principles of keeping expenditures within the limits of revenues
and maintaining a balance between revenues and expenditures, and shall not contain deficit.
The local governments shall not issue local government bonds, except as otherwise
prescribed by laws or the State Council”).

31

See Caizheng Bu Guanyu Zhuanqing Chuli Chengdu Shi Qingyang Qu Zhengfu Weigui
Fafang Difang Zhengfu Zhaiquan Wenti de Han (财政部关于转请处理成都市青羊区政府
违规发放地方政府债券问题的函) [Letter of the Ministry of Finance Regarding the Problem
of Handling the Illegal Issuance of Local Government Bonds by the Government of
Qingyang District, Chengdu, on Its Illegal Issuance of Municipal Bonds] (promulgated by the
Ministry of Finance, May 23, 2002, effective May 23, 2002), https://hk.lexiscn.com/law/lawchinese-1-33364.html (China); Li Jiuling (李九领), Woguo Difang Zhengfu Faxing Zhaiquan
de Nengli he Suzhi Fenxi (我国地方政府发行债券的能力和素质分析) [An Analysis of the
Capability and Quality of Issuance of Bonds by China’s Local Governments], ZHONGHUA
KUAIJI WANGXIAO (中华会计网校) [CHINA ON-LINE ACCOUNTING SCHOOL] (April 6, 2007,
2:45 PM), available at http://bit.ly/1X3cioL; Shi Hongxiu (时红秀), Difang Zhengfu Zhaiwu
Wenti Zai Taolun (地方政府债务出路问题再讨论) [Another Discussion of the Problem of
10

explicit permission required by law for four local governments (Shanghai, Zhejiang,
Guangdong, and Shenzhen) to issue bonds directly,32 and in November of that year, the
Shanghai municipal government issued bonds in the amount of 7.1 billion yuan.33 More
recently, the provincial governments of Shandong and Jiangsu were granted permission to
issue bonds.34 In general, therefore, fund-raising through bonds had to be done through
LGFVs—making such bonds in form corporate bonds—or not at all.
There appears to have been some debate over how the revised Budget Law should treat
local government bond issues and successive drafts treated the matter differently. In the end,
however, the final version of the amendments passed by the National People’s Congress
Standing Committee provide that provincial-level governments may, with State Council

Local Government Debt], YINHANG JIA (银行家) [THE BANKER], no. 3, 2010, at 10, 11.
32

See Guanyu Yinfa “2011 Nian Difang Zhengfu Zixing Fazhai Shidian Banfa” de Tongzhi
(关于印发《2011 年地方政府自行发债试点办法》的通知) [Notice of the Ministry of
Finance on Issuing the “Measures for the 2011 Pilot Program of Bond Issuance by Local
Governments] (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, Oct. 17, 2011, effective Oct. 17,
2011), available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=363964 (China). The same
four governments were given permission for another bond issue in 2012. See Guanyu Yinfa
“2012 Nian Difang Zhengfu Zixing Fazhai Shidian Banfa” de Tongzhi (关于印发《2012 年
地方政府自行发债试点办法》的通知) [Notice of the Ministry of Finance on Issuing the
“Measures for the 2012 Pilot Program of Bond Issuance by Local Governments]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, May 8, 2012), available at http://www.lawlib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=384271 (China).

33

See generally Shanghai Shoufa 71 Yi Difang Zhengfu Zhaiquan (上海首发 71 亿地方政
府债券) [Shanghai Issues First Government Bonds, Worth 7.1 Billion], XIN JING BAO (新京
报) (BEIJING NEWS), Nov. 16, 2011, at B05, http://bit.ly/zsMLRx; see also Guowuyuan
Pizhun Zhejiang Deng Si Di Shidian Zixing Fazhai (国务院批准浙江等 4 地试点自行发债)
[State Council Approves Four Areas Including Zhejiang for Trial Bond Issuance], HEXUN
XINWEN (和讯新闻) (HEXUN NEWS) (Oct. 20, 2011), http://news.hexun.com/2011/sdzw/
(more comprehensive discussions about the trial local government bond issuance in China).
34

See Yu Jian (于舰), Difang Zixing Fazhai Shidian Kuorong, Su Lu Liang Sheng Bei Naru
(地方自行发债试点扩容 苏鲁两省被纳入) [Pilot Program of Bond Issuance by Local
Governments Expands and Include the Provinces of Jiangsu and Shandong], DIYI CAIJING
RIBAO (第一财经日报) [FIRST FINANCE NEWS] (July 5, 2013, 1:30 AM),
http://www.yicai.com/news/2013/07/2834475.html.
11

approval, issue bonds.35 Analysts have, without contradiction from the central government,
universally interpreted the revisions as liberalizing the regime for local government bond
issues. This slightly misstates the content of the revisions. By adding a considerable amount
of text to set forth the process for issuing local government debt, the revisions certainly hint
that more such debt is contemplated. But although the central government may plan on
approving the issuance of more local government debt, the approval process is actually
tightened. Under the old Budget Law, local governments at many levels could issue bonds for
many purposes, and State Council approval was adequate. Under the revised law, bond issues
may be by provincial-level governments only and may not be for commercial projects.
Moreover, the revisions add the requirement that an overall quota for local government debt
must be approved by the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee.36
The revisions could most accurately be understood as signaling that the government
intends to approve quotas for local government debt as a routine matter and not as an
exceptional measure, but that the debt issuers and the approval process will be tightly
controlled from the top.

35

See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xiugai “Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Yusuan Fa” de Jueding (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中
华人民共和国预算法》的决定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on the Revision of the “Budget Law of
the People’s Republic of China”] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong. , Aug. 31, 2014, effective Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.lawlib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=460979 (China) (hereinafter “Budget Law Revision”), Item 30
(amending Art. 28 of the 1994 Budget Law).

36

See generally Donald Clarke, Budget Law Revisions Tighten, Not Loosen, Central
Government's Control Over Local Government Bond Issues, CHINESE LAW PROF BLOG (Oct.
3, 2014), http://bit.ly/chineselawblog-bonds.
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b. LGFVs as a response
i. History of LGFVs
In order to avoid the constraints on direct borrowing, local governments began as early as
the 1980s to turn to special-purpose vehicles (despite the absence at the time of a law on
corporate organization) to raise funds for public investment. These entities were often created
for a single purpose—construction of toll roads or utilities, for example, because such
projects had a revenue stream that could be used to service the debt—and could take loans
from international financial institutions.37
A breakthrough came in 1992 with the formation of the Shanghai Municipal
Construction Investment and Development General Company. This was a general-purpose
entity whose mission was the construction of facilities such as water supplies, roads, and
sewers. This took the financing available for urban infrastructure in Shanghai from a few
billion yuan per year to 17 billion in 1993 and 38 billion in 1994.38
This model soon spread to other areas, and most cities had established investment
corporations by 2000.39 The separation from public finance became less stringent, and some
local governments offered guarantees to lender banks.40 The investment companies also sold
bonds; by the end of 2008, there were 31 LGFV bond issues totaling 46 billion yuan.41

37

See Wong, supra note 9, at 20 et seq.; Tu Dejun (涂德君), Woguo Chengtouzhai Shichang
Fazhan de Sange Jieduan (我国城投债市场发展的三个阶段) [The Three Phases of
Development of the Chinese Market for Local Government Bonds], 2 ZHONGGUO ZHAIQUAN
(中国债券) [CHINESE BONDS] 14, 15 (2010).
38

The faith-based quality of this kind of financing is exemplified by the fact that China at the
time still had no law on corporate organization that would have governed such a company.
39

See Wong, supra note 9, at 21.

40

As will be discussed below, these guarantees have no legal validity.

41

See Tu, supra note 37, at 15.
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The next stage—and the real leap forward—in LGFV development was occasioned by
the financial crisis. The Chinese government announced a four trillion yuan stimulus, much
of it to be funded by local government borrowing through LGFVs.42 In March 2009, the
People’s Bank of China and the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued a joint notice
encouraging the use of LGFV financing,43 and borrowing took off. Over 3,200 SNGs in
China have the authority to establish LGFVs: 31 provincial-level units, 333 prefectural-level
units, and 2,859 county-level units. They had established 10,321 LGFVs by the end of 2009,
an increase of 7000 over 2008.44 In 2009 alone, there were 115 LGFV bond issues in the
total amount of 167.7 billion yuan. By 2009, LGFVs had already accumulated 5 trillion yuan
in bank loans, and in that year alone took on another 3 trillion.45 Outstanding loans to
LGFVs represented 240% of local government income, and 90% of the loans came from
banks.46 According to the National Audit Office, which appears to calculate LGFV debt

42

See generally Victor Shih, Local Government Debt: Big Rock-Candy Mountain, 14 CHINA
ECONOMIC Q., June 2010, at 26, 26-32.
43

Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang, Zhongguo Yinhangye Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guanyu
Jinyibu Jiaqiang Xindai Jiegou Tiaozheng Cujin Guomin Jingji Pingwen Jiaokuai Fazhan de
Zhidao Yijian (中国人民银行、中国银行业监督管理委员会关于进一步加强信贷结构调
整促进国民经济平稳较快发展的指导意见) [Guiding Opinions of the People's Bank of
China and China Banking Regulatory Commission on Further Adjusting the Credit Structure
to Promote the Rapid yet Steady Development of the National Economy] (promulgated by
the People’s Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Comm’n, March 18, 2009, effective
March 18, 2009), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=277462 (China).
44

See Ye, supra note 20, at 38.

45

See Wong, supra note 9, at 21 (citing Hua Qiang (华强), Gai Gei Difang Rongzi Pingtai
Daishang Jinguzhou (该给地方融资平台戴上紧箍咒) [A Restraint Collar Should Be Put on
Local Government Financing Vehicles], FENGHUANG WANG (凤凰网) [PHOENIX NETWORK]
(June 6, 2010, 11:52 PM), http://bit.ly/1RNJz3Y. Another source states that borrowing in
2009 was 4 trillion yuan, leading to total indebtedness of 7.16 trillion yuan as of the end of
the year. See Ye, supra note 20, at 38. The difference in the numbers may be accounted for by
different ways of categorizing local government borrowing; the lower figure may exclude
certain kinds of borrowing not directly connected to LGFVs. See also China’s Official Local
Debt Could Exceed CNY 14 Trl, Some Hidden Debt Excluded, CAIJING (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://english.caijing.com.cn/2013-10-28/113485388.html.

46

See Shi, supra note 31, at 10.
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more conservatively, by the end of 2010, LGFVs carried a debt load of over 4.97 trillion
yuan;47 by mid-2013, this had increased to 6.97 trillion yuan, almost forty percent of the total
17.9 trillion yuan debt load of local governments.48

47

See NAO 2011, supra note 25, Table 3.

48

See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO SHENJI SHU (中华人民共和国审计署) [NATIONAL
AUDIT OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], QUANGUO DIFANG ZHENGFUXING
ZHAIWU SHENJI JIEGUO (全国地方政府性债务审计结果) [RESULTS OF NATIONWIDE AUDIT
OF GOVERNMENT DEBT], Table 3 (2013) (on file with author) (hereinafter NAO 2013). The
amount for local government debt includes amounts for which local governments are not
legally obligated; we discuss this issue in detail in Part 3.a.ii, infra.
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[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 1: Local government debt as of June 30, 2013 (in billions of yuan)49
Contingent government debt
Type of entity incurring
debt

Debt for which local
government bears
repayment
responsibility (Type I
debt50)

Debt for which the
local government is
liable as a guarantor
(Type II debt51)

Debt for which
government may
undertake a certain
responsibility for
assistance (Type III
debt52)

Financing vehicle
companies

4075.55

883.25

2011.64

Government
departments and organs

3091.34

968.42

0

Institutions with
subsidized expenses

1776.19

103.17

515.71

State-owned financing
or holding companies

1156.25

575.41

1403.93

Institutions responsible
for their own revenues
and expenditures

346.29

37.79

218.46

Other units

316.26

83.14

0

Public service
institutions

124.03

14.39

189.64

10885.92

2665.58

4339.37

Total

As state agencies became aware of the ballooning debt, they realized at the same time
that very little was known about LGFVs. Since the middle of 2009, therefore, the government
has engaged in a massive effort to find out more about them, and the State Audit Office
launched a major investigation in the spring of 2011 covering all 31 provincial-level

49

This table is a direct reproduction of the data in NAO 2013, supra note 48, Table 3. Totals
may not equal sum of amounts in columns due to rounding.
50

See the definition in the text accompanying note 95 below.

51

See the definition in the text accompanying note 96 below.

52

See the definition in the text accompanying note 97 below.
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jurisdictions and involving 41,300 auditors. Furthermore, in 2010, the State Council issued a
document intended to rein in their activities.53 This apparently had some effect: according to
People’s Bank of China, the growth in annual borrowing by LGFVs slowed to under 20
percent in 2010, from over 50 percent in 2009.54 One source asserts that LGFVs incurred
only 300 billion yuan in new debt in 2011.55 Nevertheless, a National Audit Office study of
thirty-six local governments found that their indebtedness had increased by almost 13 percent
over the two years of 2011 and 2012.56
As of the end of 2014, officially-counted local government debt was put at 15.4 trillion
yuan by China’s Minister of Finance, with 1.06 trillion yuan as approved government bond
issues and the rest bank loans and borrowing through LGFVs.57 It was expected to reach 16
trillion by the end of 2015.58
Despite any slowing in the rate of increasing indebtedness, however, it seems clear that
the total amount is unlikely to be repayable.59 In early 2012, central and local government

53

Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Difang Zhengfu Rongzi Pingtai Gongsi Guanli Youguan
Wenti de Tongzhi (国务院关于加强地方政府融资平台公司管理有关问题的通知) [Notice
of the State Council on Issues Concerning Strengthening the Management of Local
Government Financing Vehicle Companies] (promulgated by the St. Council, June 10, 2010,
effective June 10, 2010), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-06/13/content_1627195.htm (China)
(hereinafter State Council 2010).
54

See Zhan Xiangyang (詹向阳), Bianzheng Kandai Difang Zhengfu Rongzi Pingtai Fazhan
(辩证看待地方政府融资平台发展) [Dialectically Viewing the Development of Local
Government Financing Vehicles], 7 ZHONGGUO JINRONG (中国金融) [CHINA FIN.] 38, 38-40
(2010).

55

See Sufang Xie (谢素芳), Zhengfu Juzhai: Guifan he Jiandu Shuangguan Qixia (政府举
债：规范和监督双管齐下) [Government Debt: To Regulate and to Supervise
Simultaneously], ZHONGGUO REN DA (中国人大) [CHINESE PEOPLE'S CONGRESS], no. 6,
2012, at 35, 35.

56

See NAO 2013, supra note 48, Table 3.

57

See China to Refinance 11 Trln Local Govt. Debt, SHENZHEN DAILY, Dec. 30, 2015.

58

See id.

59

See Shih, supra note 42, at 27.
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officials began negotiating with banks over how to deal with the estimated 1.8 trillion yuan in
loans to LGFVs scheduled to mature in 2012.60 According to contemporary news reports,
“Banks are being asked to rejigger repayment schedules and let borrowers settle maturing
debt with fresh loans under a risk-mitigation plan drafted by the central government.”61 A
2013 report by Nomura stated that half of LGFV debt due on 2012 would have been at risk of
default were it not for local government support.62 Moreover, in late 2012 several Chinese
government departments issued yet another joint notice intended to rein in LGFV borrowing,
indicating that the problem had yet to be brought under control.63
News reports indicate that about three quarters of the four trillion yuan that local
governments were to repay to banks by the end of 2012—this figure likely includes, but is
not limited to, LGFV debt—was in fact rolled over.64 More recently, on December 31, 2013,
the National Development and Reform Commission officially authorized local governments
to roll over LGFV debt through yet more LGFV bond issues.65
The last two years have seen yet more government ambivalence about LGFVs. In
October 2014, the State Council issued its famous Document 43,66 which was intended to put

60

See Kan Huo, Local Governments Hope to Dodge Debt Deadlines, CAIXIN (Feb. 24, 2012,
4:13 PM), http://english.caixin.com/2012-02-24/100360506.html.

61

Id.

62

See Bettina Wassener, Report Warns of Chinese Municipal Debt Risks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
26, 2013), http://nyti.ms/1unppTY.

63

Guanyu Zhizhi Difang Zhengfu Weifa Weigui Rongzi Xingwei de Tongzhi (关于制止地
方政府违法违规融资行为的通知) [Notice on Putting a Stop to Local Governments' Illegal
Financing Activities] (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, Nat’l Dev. & Reform
Comm’n, People’s Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 24, 2012,
effective Dec. 24, 2012), http://bit.ly/1O9uNqt (China) (hereinafter MOF et al. 2012).
64

See Simon Rabinovitch, China Averts Local Government Defaults, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan.
29, 2013, available at http://on.ft.com/1xaPzZP.

65

See Simon Rabinovitch, China Gives Local Governments Go-Ahead to Roll Over Debt,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 2, 2014, available at http://on.ft.com/ZGMINt.

66

Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Difang Zhengfuxing Zhaiwu Guanli de Yijian (国务院关于
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the brake on LGFV financing.67 It essentially said that local governments could no longer
borrow money through LGFVs. In the same month, the National Development and Reform
Commission, which has jurisdiction over corporate bonds generally, issued a document
raising the bar for corporate bond issues.68
In May, 2015, however, perhaps concerned by an economic slowdown, three government
agencies jointly issued Document 40,69 which was widely viewed as reversing many of the
policies embodied in Document 43. In the words of one report,
Under [Document 43], [LGFVs] were barred from borrowing additional funds starting this year, as
the government sought to close what it dubbed “the back door” for localities to borrow. Instead, all
borrowing would be done by the local governments themselves and be appropriately disclosed and
reflected in their budget plans. The purpose was to rein in runaway local-debt growth and make local
borrowings more transparent.
According to the latest directive, local financing firms can continue to get loans from banks to fund
ongoing projects. If the local firms have trouble repaying their bank debts, the rule says, their loan
contracts should be “renegotiated and extended.”70

加强地方政府性债务管理的意见) [Opinions on Strengthening the Regulation of
Governmental Debts] (promulgated by the St. Council, Oct. 2, 2014, effective Oct. 2, 2014),
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-10/02/content_9111.htm (China) (hereinafter State
Council 2014).
67

See Xinhua News Agency, supra note 48.

68

See Huo, supra note 60.

69

Guowuyuan Bangongting Zhuanfa Caizheng Bu Renmin Yinhang Yinjianhui Guanyu
Tuoshan Jiejue Difang Zhengfu Rongzi Pingtai Gongsi Zaijian Xiangmu Houxu Rongzi
Wenti Yijian de Tongzhi (国务院办公厅转发财政部人民银行银监会关于妥善解决地方政
府融资平台公司在建项目后续融资问题意见的通知) [Notice of the General Office of the
State Council Transmitting Opinion of the Ministry of Finance, the People's Bank of China,
and the China Banking Regulatory Commission on Appropriately Handling the Follow-up
Financing Issues of In-Process Projects of Local Government Financing Vehicle Companies]
(promulgated by the Gen. Off. of the St. Council, May 15, 2015, effective May 15, 2015),
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/15/content_9760.htm (China).

70

Lingling Wei, China Backtracks on Local Government Debt, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2015,
available at http://on.wsj.com/1KSd5ku.
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ii. Structure of LGFVs
LGFVs are usually organized under China’s Company Law as limited liability
companies. Usually, either the local government itself or the local branch of the State Asset
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is the sole shareholder.71 In some
cases, the LGFV is a joint venture among two or three entities such as state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) affiliated with the local government and other government or quasigovernmental agencies.72
Most LGFVs focus on local infrastructure construction projects as well as other public
welfare projects such as education, environmental protection, and medical care.73 Some
engage in side business activities of various kinds as well.74
In 2010, the State Council issued a notice that for various purposes classified LGFVs into
three classes.75 The first class of LGFVs are those used to finance non-profit public welfare
projects which will not generate income, and therefore will pay off their debts mainly by cash
transfers from government funds. The second class of LGFVs are those used to finance
public welfare projects that return a steady profit, and therefore are expected to pay their

71

See, for example, the information about the issuer provided in the Leshan, Yongzhou,
Tianjin, Zhuzhou, and Nanjing prospectuses.

72

See, for example, the information about the issuer provided in the Hebei Bohai and
Zhenjiang prospectuses.

73

See Xu Yuan (徐瑗), Hu Zuliu: Caozuo Bu Touming Shi Difang Rongzi Zhenzheng
Fengxian (胡祖六：操作不透明是地方融资真正风险) [Hu Zuliu: Lack of Transparency in
Operations Is the Real Risk of Local Financing], XINLANG XINWEN (新浪新闻) [SINA NEWS]
(July 5, 2011, 10: 27 AM), http://bit.ly/zpeOu5 (interview with Hu Zuliu, Goldman Sachs
(Asia)’s LLC Executive Director and Asia Pacific chief economist) [hereinafter Interview
with Hu Zuliu].
74

See Difang Zhengfu Rongzi Pingtai Gongsi Luanxiang (地方政府融资平台公司乱象)
[The Chaos of Local Government Financing Vehicles], DONGFANG ZAOBAO (东方早报)
[ORIENTAL MORNING POST], June 28, 2011, at A33, available at http://bit.ly/1JF90xS
(hereinafter LGFV Chaos).

75

See State Council 2010, supra note 53.
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debts with income from those projects. The third class of LGFVs are those used to finance
non-public welfare projects.76 Many government agencies, including the National
Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance, have issued various
directives or notices that interpret and implement the Notice.77
iii. LGFV bonds
As discussed above, while local governments may not issue bonds, companies may, and
LGFVs are companies. As of 2013, approximately eight or nine hundred LGFVs out of a total
of about 10,800 had publicly issued bonds.78 LGFV bonds are usually underwritten by a
group of underwriters led by a lead underwriter and issued to Chinese institutional investors.
Some bond issuances, however, are clearly aimed at non-Chinese investors. For example, the
offering prospectus in an issue by a Beijing LGFV contains the following language:
Pursuant to this offering, the Securities may not be offered or sold in the United States, except
that the Securities may be offered or sold to persons who are “qualified institutional buyers,” as
defined in Rule 144A under the Securities Act in reliance on the exemption from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act provided by Rule 144A.79

76

See id.

77

See, e.g., Guojia Fazhangaigewei Bangongting Guanyu Jinyibu Guifan Difang Zhengfu
Tourongzi Pingtai Gongsi Faxing Zhaiquan Xingwei Youguan Wenti De Tongzhi (国家发展
改革委办公厅关于进一步规范地方政府投融资平台公司发行债券行为有关问题的通知)
(issued by Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, Nov. 20, 2010, effective Nov. 20, 2010), available
at http://bit.ly/1MVVivY; see also Guanyu Guanche Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Difang
Zhengfu Rongzi Pingtai Gongsi Guanli Youguan Wenti De Tongzhi Xiangguan Shixiang De
Tongzhi (关于贯彻国务院关于加强地方政府融资平台公司管理有关问题的通知相关事
项的通知) [Notice on Matters Related to the Implementation of the State Council’s Notice
on Issues Regarding the Strengthening of Control over Local Government Financing
Vehicles] (jointly issued by Ministry of Finance, Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, People’s
Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Comm’n, July 30, 2010, effective July 30, 2010),
available at http://bit.ly/1hpmKGt (hereinafter MOF et al. 2010).

78

Standard Chartered, On the Ground: Global Research: China – Local Debt: USD 3.64.0tn and Counting, at 2 (Oct. 2, 2013) (on file with author).

79

MEGA PROSPECTUS at iii.
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The underwriters in that bond issue included BofA Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and
Credit Suisse, among others, and the governing law was stipulated to be New York law.80
c. Confusion in the System
Although the rules and principles of government and LGFV borrowing seem fairly clear,
there is evidence of a great deal of confusion and variation in practice. This could be due to
the sources’ being careless in their terminology, but could also be a sign that actual practice
diverges widely from what the law prescribes.
i. Do LGFV bonds have an implicit government guarantee?
It is frequently asserted that LGFV bonds carry an implicit government guarantee even
where such a guarantee is not explicit. One recent paper even asserts that this guarantee
comes from the central government, not just the local government that owns the issuing
LGFV.81 We question this assertion.
Since an “implicit” guarantee is by definition unstated, no affirmative evidence can be
adduced for it. The support for the assertion frequently comes from another assertion that
bond buyers believe that the bonds are implicitly guaranteed. We call this the Tinkerbell
theory of rights: if you believe in something hard enough, you can bring it into existence. But
the Chinese legal system does not adopt this theory. More to the point, empirical evidence
contradicts that claim that bond buyers believe an implicit guarantee exists.
Most obviously, if LGFV bond buyers truly believed that all LGFV bonds carried a
central government guarantee, we would expect to see identical credit ratings on all LGFV

80

See MEGA PROSPECTUS at cover page, 107.

81

See Andrew Ang, Jennie Bai & Hao Zhou, The Great Wall of Debt: The Cross Section of
Chinese Local Government Credit Spreads (Georgetown McDonough School of Business,
Research Paper No. 2603022, 2015; Columbia Business School, Research Paper No. 15-57,
2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2603022.
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bonds. But we do not.82 We would also expect to see identical interest rates on bonds with
identical maturities and liquidity characteristics. Again, we do not. A group of scholars
working with a dataset of LGFV bond issues from 1997 to 2014 found that LGFV bond
interest rates reflected both economic risk and political risk.83 When they were swapped for
provincial government obligations under a program introduced in the spring of 2015,
Moody’s rated the bonds Triple-A, regardless of which province issued them, on the grounds
that they were (in the view of Moody’s) implicitly backed by the central government,84 a
judgment Moody’s had not (to the best of our knowledge) made about LGFV bonds.
The financial system itself recognized the riskiness of LGFV bonds: the clearing agency
for exchange-traded debt announced that LGFV bonds rated lower than AAA could not be
used as collateral for short-term loans because they were too risky.85
Finally, there is no support in law for the notion of an implicit guarantee. As discussed
below,86 government guarantees are explicitly labeled invalid in the Guarantee Law, the only
law that could make them valid. Moreover, in case the Guarantee Law was not clear enough,
the central government has issued pronouncements both disclaiming its own responsibility
for local debt87 and reminding the public that local government guarantees are invalid.88

82

See BNP Paribas, Equities Research: China Banks: 10 Questions on the LGFV Debt Swap
Programme, June 25, 2015, at 1.

83

See Ang et al., supra note 81.

84

See Mudi: Difang Zhai Pingji Weishenme Dou Shi AAA? (穆迪：地方债评级为什么都是
AAA?) [Moody’s: Why is all the local debt rated AAA?], DIYI CAIJING (第一财经) [First
Finance & Economy], June 12, 2015, available at http://bit.ly/1TZd05g (citing Moody’s
vice-general manager Zhu Shuning).

85

See China’s Second LGFV Bond Sale in Doubt as State Support Pulled, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Dec. 16, 2014, 12:24 PM), http://bloom.bg/1EtPTLF.
86

See infra Part 3.b.i and notes 115-128 and accompanying text.

87

See State Council 2014, supra note 66, Part IV, Para. 2.

88

See State Council 2010, supra note 53; MOF et al. 2010, supra note 77.
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Above and beyond these theoretical considerations, we now have a bit of empirical
evidence as well. Alarming reports have recently surfaced of corporate debtors, both ordinary
corporations and LGFVs, defaulting in unprecedented ways. In March 2014, solar equipment
maker Chaori defaulted on a bond, marking the first corporate bond default in reform-era
China.89 More worrisome from the standpoint of LGFV creditors is the reported first default
of an LGFV on a bank loan, which came to light in mid-2014.90 Clearly this is one LGFV
whose debt was not backed by the government.
In light of the above, it is hard to see what evidence could support the claim that implicit
government guarantees either exist or are even widely believed by investors to exist. Both
documentary evidence and empirical observation suggest the contrary.
ii. What do National Audit Office categories mean?
A further source of confusion is the National Audit Office’s (NAO) way of categorizing
LGFV and local government debt. The NAO has carried out two major investigations of
LGFV and local government debt, the first in 2011 and the second in 2013. These
investigations were carried out pursuant to instructions from the State Council first set forth

89

See Lingling Wei, Shanghai Chaori in Default on Bond Interest Payments, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 6, 2014, available at http://on.wsj.com/1pBfS6s. The article does not add the
qualification “reform-era China”, but we feel it is wise, since there may well have been
defaults in the early years of the People’s Republic of China on bonds issued before 1949.
90

See Pete Sweeney, Chinese Bank Sues Local Govt Property Company in Rare Public Spat,
REUTERS, July 2, 2014, available at http://reut.rs/1unnleW. Of course, it could always be
argued that the defaulting company was not an LGFV, but a different kind of company that
was nevertheless wholly owned by the local government. But this comes perilously close to
arguing that LGFVs are essentially by definition any government-owned company that we
see after the fact getting its debt paid off by local government. This is not helpful to creditors
or analysts ex ante.
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in a 2011 document.91 That document charged the NAO with classifying local government
debt into three types.92
Type I debt is described as “debt for which local government bears repayment
responsibility,” and is defined more precisely as follows:
Borrowing undertaken by local government (including government departments and agencies),
institutions financially supported [by local government], institutions with a public purpose,93
government financing vehicles, and other relevant units, that is confirmed to be repayable94 from
government budgetary finances, where the government bears direct responsibility for repayment. The
first kind is local government bonds, national bonds converted to loans, foreign debt converted to
loans, loans for overall development of agriculture, and other governmental debts converted to loans
that have been confirmed to be repayable from government budgetary finances. The second kind is
debt incurred by government financing vehicles, government departments and agencies, institutions
financially supported [by local government], institutions with a public purpose, and other units
through borrowing, owing, repurchase obligations, or other means that has been confirmed to be
repayable from government budgetary finances (not including revenues from road tolls, tuition, and
the like). The third type is policy-related amounts payable by local government food enterprises and
supply and marketing enterprises.95

91

Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Zuohao Difang Zhengfuxing Zhaiwu Shenji Gongzuo
de Tongzhi (国务院办公厅关于做好地方政府性债务审计工作的通知) [Notice of the
General Office of the State Council on Properly Handling the Audit of the Governmental
Debts] (promulgated by the Gen. Off. of the St. Council, Feb. 13, 2011, effective Feb. 13,
2011), http://laws.66law.cn/law-129676.aspx (China) (hereinafter Audit Notice).
92

For an example of the classifications in use, see Table 1 above at text accompanying note
49.
93

The term used here, gongyong shiye danwei (公用事业单位), refers to institutions such as
schools, hospitals, railroads, and public utilities.
94

Here and elsewhere, “to be repayable” is intended to convey an obligation, and is not to be
understood as a statement of fact about the borrower’s financial capability.

95

Audit Notice, supra note 91.
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Type II debt is described as “debt for which the local government is liable as a
guarantor,” and is defined more precisely as follows:
Debt for which a local government (including government departments and agencies) has provided a
direct or indirect guarantee such that when the debtor is unable to repay the debt, the government
bears joint liability for repayment. The first type is borrowing undertaken by government financing
vehicles, institutions financially supported [by local government], institutions with a public purpose,
and other units that has been confirmed to be repayable from the operational revenues (including
tuition fees), business revenues (including road tolls), or other non-[government] budgetary funds of
the debtor unit, with respect to which the local government (including government departments and
agencies) has provided a direct or indirect guarantee. The second type is borrowing undertaken by a
local government (including government departments and agencies) that is to be repaid from nonbudgetary funds; such debt is to be deemed debt guaranteed by government.96

Type III debt is described as “other relevant debt,” and is defined more precisely as
follows:
Borrowing undertaken for projects with a public purpose by government financing vehicles,
institutions financially supported [by local government], and institutions with a public purpose that is
to be repaid from non-budgetary funds, where the local government (including government
departments and agencies) has not provided a guarantee (not including debt owed to other units or
individuals). The government does not as a legal matter bear any liability for this type of debt, but
when the debtor faces a debt crisis, it may be necessary for the government to shoulder responsibility
for providing relief.97 (Emphasis added.)

The problem with these categories is that, as we have noted above, legal borrowing by
governments and government departments is difficult—the PBOC Lending Principles seem
to forbid it—and government guarantees are unquestionably invalid as a legal matter. What
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type of debt, then, is classed as Type I and Type II debt, and how is it different from Type III
debt?
The standard answer regarding Type I and Type II debt is that the NAO does not use
strict legal categories for classifying debt, and includes in Types I and II obligations for
which the local government is not liable in a strict legal sense, but can nevertheless be
meaningfully said to be liable for a variety of reasons such as informal promises, budgetary
commitments from the local government, or political pressures. The problem with this answer
is that debt for which local government is not liable in a strict legal sense seems to be
precisely the kind of debt that the State Council wants categorized as Type III debt.
Moreover, it makes any figures for such debt useless for comparative purposes, since
statistics for local government debt in other countries may or may not include amounts for
which local government is not legally liable.98
One answer might lie in the distinction between repayment from budgetary funds and
repayment from non-budgetary funds. In some circumstances, local people’s congresses may
provide that repayment of debt shall come from budgetary funds, and such debt is specifically
excluded from Type III. Any budgetary commitment made by a people’s congress may, of
course, be later unmade by the same or a different people’s congress, so such a provision is
not legally binding. Nevertheless, perhaps it is considered sufficient to deem the debt Type I
debt.
The NAO reports offer further paradoxes in their breakdowns of Type I and Type II debt.
Take Type I debt—debt for which the local government is said to be directly responsible—in
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For a canvassing of the various ways government “debt” can be defined, including the
counting of unfunded pension liabilities or revocable legislative promises, see Jennifer
Weiner, Assessing the Affordability of State Debt (New England Public Policy Center
Research Report 13-2, Dec. 2013), available at http://bit.ly/weiner-statedebt.
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the 2013 NAO report.99 Fully twenty-eight percent (3.1 trillion yuan) of it is classified as
LGFV debt.100 This makes no sense. If local government is directly (i.e., primarily)
responsible for payment, then it, not an LGFV, is the debtor. If the LGFV is the primary
debtor, then the debt should be classified as Type II or Type III debt. Nevertheless, the State
Council’s instructions contemplate just such a subcategory, but it is difficult to know what
exactly it meant.
Moreover, slightly under six percent (614.6 billion yuan) of local government Type I debt
is said to come from bond issues.101 In its 2011 report, the NAO put the figure at 551 billion
yuan. As we have seen, local governments at that time did not have authority to issue bonds
absent specific authorization from the State Council. And the numbers cannot be attributed to
bonds issued by other entities that the local government is deemed to have guaranteed,
whether lawfully or unlawfully, since such an obligation should clearly by Type II or Type III
debt. The listed debt might be attributable to legally issued bonds, but one wonders. The first
publicized instances of State Council permission for local governments to issue bonds were
in late 2011.102 Such bonds could not have been included in the 2011 NAO Report, however,
since the investigation on which it was based concluded in May 2011.103
As for Type II debt—debt for which local government is said to be contingently
responsible through a guarantee—thirty-three percent (883 billion yuan) is classified as
LGFV debt.104 But as we have seen, local government cannot legally be even indirectly
responsible for LGFV debt. A small amount (49 billion yuan) is even attributed to local
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government guarantees of local government bonds. It is difficult to know what this means:
even if the bonds were somehow lawfully issued, debtors do not guarantee their own
obligations. In any case, as noted below, in our review of bond prospectuses we did not find a
single one in which a government purported to offer a legally binding guarantee.
In short, despite the detail in the State Council’s instructions to the NAO, we cannot feel
confident that we understand the criteria the NAO is using to classify local government debt.
We can probably rule out certain criteria, however, including the criterion of legal
obligations. Thus, it is important to recognize that when government officials and
commentators speak of local government debt obligations in China, they are not speaking of
legal obligations. Consequently, comparisons with legal obligations of local governments in
other times and places are dangerous.
3. What Stands Behind LGFV Bonds? Safeguards for Repayment
a. Introduction
LGFV bonds are risky. Although individual bond issues vary in their risk, it seems very
unlikely that they can as a whole be repaid. As of the end of 2010, the total direct and
contingent (via guarantees) obligations of SNGs were put by the NAO at 70% of their annual
revenue sources.105 And at the same time, 78 city-level and 99 county-level governments had
direct obligations of more than 100% of their annual revenues.106 In 2010, 358 LGFVs
borrowed new debt to cover their old debt, and 148 LGFVs had overdue debt, totaling
approximately RMB 8 billion.107
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See NAO 2011, supra note 25, Sec. 1.5. As discussed in the preceding section, and in Part
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LGFV-funded projects typically do not generate large revenue streams; a survey
conducted by the People’s Bank of China revealed that the average profitability of the assets
owned by LGFVs is less than 1.3%.108 In some cases this is normal and intended: a highly
efficient and worthwhile public works project may have positive externalities that cannot be
charged for, and thus may not generate a cash return adequate to repay the investment. In
other cases, the project itself may be misconceived: local leaders have strong incentives to
show local GDP growth, banks (especially since the 2008 stimulus program began) have
strong incentives to lend, and the result can be white elephant projects that contribute to GDP
in the same way that digging a hole and filling it up again does: toll roads without cars,
residential blocks without inhabitants, and airports without airplanes.109 In short, only a very
small fraction of LGFV debt can be repaid in full by cash generated by their investment
projects.110
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that was conducted by Institute of Finance & Banking, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
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These repayment concerns make necessary a closer look at what stands behind LGFV
debt and, for the purposes of this article, LGFV bonds in particular. In some cases, the bond
issues offer what purports to be a formal security interest in assets or an income stream. Other
issues purport to be secured by a guarantee. While the economic value of the assets is an
important issue worth considering, the focus of this article is on the legal status of the various
mechanisms offered as a safeguard for repayment. Since whether such safeguards amount to
a security interest in the legal sense is precisely one of the important issues to be determined,
and because not all safeguards indeed amount to security interests but are not necessarily
worthless for that reason, we shall generally use the term “repayment safeguard” or “backup”
instead of “security interest”. This usage is in fact reflected in the offer prospectuses
themselves, which almost always use the term “repayment safeguard measures” (偿债保证措
施 or 偿还保障措施) to head a section setting forth the various reasons—economic, legal,
formal and informal, binding and non-binding—why investors should feel reassured about
repayment.
b. Safeguards
As noted in the Introduction, for this article we reviewed LGFV bond offer prospectuses
from different regions in China in two different time periods and examined the proffered
safeguards. Some bond issues explicitly stated that there was no security for the bonds,
although they did offer other reasons for buyers to have confidence that they would be paid.
Other issues offered security that would be recognized under the Guarantee Law:
mortgaged land use rights, a pledge of future receivables, and third-party guarantees.
Falling somewhere between nothing and something were assurances of the local
government’s “strong support” (大力支持), including at times a description of the local
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government plans to allocate a certain amount of funds periodically to the LGFV in order to
help it repay the bondholders.
Several bond issues stated that funds for scheduled payments of principal and interest
would be placed at some point into a special bank account that could only be used for such
payments. As we shall discuss, the legal robustness of this structure is questionable. Absent a
formal security interest in the account granted to bondholders, it is hard to see how other
creditors could be prevented from getting their hands on such funds.
Interestingly, 19 of the 20 Group II prospectuses explicitly stated that there was no
security for repayment, a marked change from the Group I prospectuses.
In the following section, we provide a detailed examination of the various safeguard
methods. We discuss why they do or do not qualify as a valid security interest, in what
respects they are inadequate even if they do so qualify, and how their deficiencies might be
cured.
i. No security
A number of bond issues explicitly state that there is no security for repayment.111 In
most cases, however, the offer prospectuses attempt to provide reasons for bondholders to
have confidence that they will be repaid.
In some cases, the assurance amounts to nothing more than a promise that the business
will be run efficiently and show a profit. In other cases of both secured and unsecured debt,
the offer recites that the LGFV has the “strong support” (大力支持) of the local
government.112 This support can take the form of special business opportunities and even
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commitments to make good through appropriations any shortfall in LGFV repayments.113
Some offer prospectuses also note the existence of special bank accounts into which the local
government will periodically make payments, and state that the funds from those accounts
can be used only to pay back the debt.
None of these safeguards amounts to a security interest in the sense of an asset of
reasonably reliable value to which bondholders have top-priority access.
First, the “special accounts” described in so many prospectuses do not seem to have any
legal status under China’s Guarantee Law and thus do not offer any special protection for
creditors. At any given moment, funds intended for the account are owned either by the local
government or by the LGFV. (It is not clear who has formal ownership over the account
itself, but it must be one or the other.) If the funds belong to the local government, they are
off-limits to LGFV creditors. Once transferred to the LGFV, they are available to all
creditors, not just bondholders.
The only way bondholders can protect these funds from other creditors is to have a
proper security interest in them, but the disclosures say nothing about such a security interest
having been established in the accounts. Without such a security interest, the prior claim of
the bondholders to funds in the account is, at most, a contractual one between the LGFV and
the bondholders—the LGFV could not, for example, use the funds for some other purpose—
but that contractual claim cannot trump the interests of other creditors who did not agree to it.
Second, the various assurances of support that come from local governments and
People’s Congresses do not bind either them or their successors. If a People’s Congress
passes a resolution promising to support a certain project, a successor can pass another

YICHUN PROSPECTUS & ZHENJIANG PROSPECTUS.
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resolution undoing the first. All that such resolutions can do as a legal matter is forestall an
argument that a local government was somehow acting ultra vires in establishing a LGFV
and having it issue bonds; they do not operate to bind the local government (or the local
People’s Congress) to repay the bonds.114
Many of these assurances fall under the general rubric of informal guarantees by local
governments of LGFV debt. Such guarantees must remain informal, however, because formal
guarantees of indebtedness by local governments are prohibited, invalid, and unenforceable.
The Guarantee Law of the People's Republic of China (“Guarantee Law”) provides
“government agencies cannot act as guarantors, except in the case of sub-lending loans from
foreign governments or international economic organizations, and approved by the State
Council of the People’s Republic of China.”115 Obviously, government guarantees for LGFV
bonds do not fall within this limited exception. Indeed, there is a solid precedent on precisely
this point: the 1999 bankruptcy of the Guangdong International Trust and Investment
Corporation. In that case, all the “loan registrations, state and provincial guarantees, and
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According to one study, research in Guangdong province revealed that typically the
general office of the county or municipal People’s Congress Standing Committee would issue
a letter “acknowledging” the loan deal between the bank and the local government. See
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Danbao Fa (担保法) [Guarantee Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., June 30, 1995, effective Oct. 1, 1995), art. 8 [hereinafter Guarantee Law].
This prohibition has now been written into the Budget Law as well. See Budget Law
Revision, supra note 35, at Item 30.
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‘comfort letters’ with which foreign loans are trussed up count[ed] for little.”116 Investors
have no realistic prospects of winning a case based on a government guarantee in case of
default,117 and, tellingly, auditors are told to treat them as invalid.118
Various government agencies have periodically restated this rule just to make sure
everyone gets the point. In June 2010, the State Council issued a notice emphasizing that
local governments had to follow the rules of the Guarantee Law and must not issue
guarantees.119 The following month, the Ministry of Finance, together with several other
government departments, issued a notice further clarifying the State Council’s notice.120 This
notice repeated that all guarantees were unlawful, although in a backhanded way seemed to
acknowledge the binding nature of previous guarantees by stating that as of the date of the
notice, local governments would no longer be liable for the debts of LGFVs (beyond, of
course, the loss of their investment). In September 2010, the Ministry of Finance issued a
“Notice on Regulating Local Government Acts of Incurring Debt and Issuing Guarantees and
Promises”.121 The notice states, inter alia, that local governments must “strictly implement
116
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the provisions of [the Guarantee Law], and may not issue guarantees, promises, comfort
letters, or other forms of direct or disguised guarantee; . . . they may not promise to bear
liability for repayment of debt undertaken for the financing of other enterprises or
institutions . . . .”122 And in December 2012, the Ministry of Finance together with several
other departments issued yet another notice123 repeating the exact language of the 2010
notice.
Litigation since the enactment of the Guarantee Law tells the same story, although with
an interesting twist on the question of remedies. Up until the end of 2014, creditors who sued
governmental entities on their guarantees seem to have received a consistent result in Chinese
courts: the guarantee was held invalid and unenforceable, but the defendant guarantor was
held liable for up to half (never more) of the unpaid debt on a theory that it shared fault with
the creditor for the invalidity of the guarantee contract, and relevant law provided for liability
in such cases.124 In May 2014, the Guangdong Province Higher-Level People’s Court held a
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terms in Article 58 of the Contract Law (liability for invalid contracts) and much more
specifically in Article 5 of the Guarantee Law, which states that when a guarantee contract is
found to be invalid, the debtor, creditor, and guarantor shall each bear civil liability in
proportion to their fault. This provision was then enlarged upon in a Supreme People’s Court
interpretation of 2000. This interpretation repeated that government guarantees were invalid
and that the damage to the creditor from invalidity should be handled in accordance with
Article 5 of the Guarantee Law. It added, however, that where the creditor and the guarantor
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press conference specifically to announce that in recent years they had processed a large
number of lawsuits seeking to enforce guarantees against local governments and that such
guarantees were invalid. It then presented what it called a typical case, in which the local
government was held liable for one third of the unpaid debt on the theory of fault discussed
above.125

routinely found at fault for making guarantees they should not have made, and creditors are
equally routinely found at fault at the same time for carelessly accepting a guarantee from an
entity they should have known did not have the capacity to make it.
The most sophisticated exposition of this theory can be found in a pragmatic and wellreasoned judgment of the Guangdong Province Higher-Level People’s Court in the case of
Foshan Shi Chancheng Qu Renmin Zhengfu Yu Jiaotong Yinhang Xianggang Fenhang
Jiekuan Danbao Hetong Jiufen Shangsu’an (佛山市禅城区人民政府与交通银行香港分行
借款担保合同纠纷上诉案) [Appeal Case of Foshan City Chancheng District People’s
Government v. Communications Bank of China, Hong Kong Branch] (Guangdong Higher
People’s Ct. Jan. 22, 2003), available at http://www.pkulaw.cn/case/pfnl_117623577.html
(China) (hereinafter Foshan Case). The case and the principles behind it are discussed by
Prof. Yang Lixin in Yang Lixin (杨立新), Chengnuo Han, Zuigao’e Baozheng, Wuxiao
Baozheng Peichang Zeren (承诺函，最高额保证，无效保证赔偿责任) [Liability for
Commitment Letters, Maximum Guarantees, and Invalid Guarantees], 110 FALÜ ZIXUN
WANG (110 法律咨询网) [110 LEGAL ADVICE] (July 11, 2010, 00:10 AM),
http://www.110.com/falv/wuquanfa/wuquanfaanli/2010/0711/80808.html. There are other
cases with the same reasoning and result: see, e.g., Zhen Zhengfu Danbao Qiye Jiekuan,
Fayuan Pan Danbao Wuxiao, Zhen Zhengfu You Guocuo (镇政府担保企业借款 法院判担
保无效 镇政府有过错) [County Government Guarantees Loan to Enterprise, Court Rules
that Guarantee Is Invalid but that County Government Is at Fault], CHENGDU SHANGBAO (成
都商报) [CHENGDU BUS. NEWS] (July 9, 2010), http://cdsb.newssc.org/html/201007/09/content_990345.htm (township government found liable for half of unpaid debt on
theory of fault for invalidity of guarantee); Jian Zhengbo (简正波), Guojia Jiguan Danbao
Wuxiao, Peichang Zeren Buneng Mianchu (国家机关担保无效 赔偿责任不能免除) [State
Organ Cannot Be Exempt from Liability Even if Its Guarantee Was Invalid], JIUJIANG
FAYUAN WANG (九江法院网) [JIUJIANG COURT NETWORK] (May 15, 2012, 3:36 PM),
http://jjzy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=24434 (reporting a case from Jiangxi province
where sub-county local government purported to guarantee a debt and was found liable for
half the unpaid amount on the same theory); Chen Guiping (陈桂平), Guquan Zhuanrang
Jiufen: Zhengfu Liandai Danbao Xiaoli Ruhe (股权转让纠纷——政府连带担保效力如何)
[Equity Transfer Dispute: What Is the Validity of Government’s Joint and Several
Guarantee], ZHONGGUO LÜSHI WANG (中国律师网) [CHINA LAWYER NETWORK] (Dec. 30,
2013, 11:55 AM), http://www.acla.org.cn/lvshiwushi/14146.jhtml (discussing 2005
Heilongjiang case involving government of Tongjiang City with similar circumstances,
similar liability, and similar theory).
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One problem with this way of handling cases of government guarantees is that it seems
to go directly against the intent behind the prohibition on government guarantees: to prevent
local governments from becoming liable for the debts of third parties. Making local
governments liable for half of the unpaid debt on a theory of fault does an end run around the
prohibition, and means that for all intents and purposes local governments in fact do have the
capacity to guarantee up to half the debt of third parties—even more if a court finds that the
creditor was without fault. Although the courts’ unwillingness to let local governments
simply disavow their promises without any consequences is understandable, surely this is not
the result the drafters of the Guarantee Law intended or expected by their prohibition.
A recent Supreme People’s Court case from late 2014, however, has changed the picture
in favor of local governments. In Bank of China v. Liaoning Provincial People’s
Government,126 the creditor sued the Liaoning provincial government to enforce a guarantee
the defendant had purportedly made, and the SPC found the government liable for no part of
the debt.
The case bears a very strong factual resemblance to a 2002 Guangdong province case in
which the Foshan city government was found partially liable on a guarantee.127 In that case,
the Foshan government had issued a document apparently called a “promise letter”
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(chengnuo han). The letter promised that if the debtor was late in paying the debt, the
government would “take responsibility for resolving the situation” and “not cause [the
creditor] to suffer economic loss” (bushi . . . zai jingji shang mengshou sunshi). The word
“guarantee” was apparently never used. Despite the defendant’s argument that this promise
letter created only a responsibility to try to get the debtor to repay and was not a formal
guarantee, the court held that it clearly indicated an intention to issue a guarantee. Of course,
the court also found that the purported guarantee was invalid, but finding that this language
constituted an attempt to make a guarantee meant that the court could find the Foshan
government liable for half the unpaid debt on a theory of fault.
In the Bank of China case, however, the SPC looked at virtually identical language and
found the defendant entirely free of liability. As in the Foshan case, the provincial
government had issued a document entitled “Promise Letter” (chengnuo han), stating inter
alia that the provincial government promised that if the borrower could not repay any amount
owing under the terms of the loan, the government would “assist in resolving the debt owed
by the borrower” to the bank and “would not let the bank suffer any economic loss” (burang
guihang zai jingjishang mengshou renhe sunshi), language which is if anything slightly
stronger than that of the Foshan case. Nevertheless, the SPC found that the promise did not
constitute an attempt to make a formal guarantee, and constituted instead merely a kind of
comfort letter that did not purport to be legally binding. Unlike in previous cases, the
defendant provincial government was found not liable at all for any of the debt it had (at least
arguably) purported to guarantee.
Given that the Bank of China case is an SPC case and thus presumably influential, it
suggests the following set of rules for future cases. First, if the word “guarantee” is not used,
governments will not be held liable for any amount of debt that they purport to guarantee.
Second, if the word “guarantee” is used, governments may be found to have attempted to
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make a guarantee, and if so, will be held liable for some portion of the debt depending on the
court’s judgment as to the relative fault of the creditor and the guarantor for the invalidity of
the guarantee. Courts are likely to find the guarantor at fault and liable for half, but not more,
of the unpaid amount of the debt.
In sum, guarantees by governmental entities are prohibited and invalid; courts will not
recognize them and will not even attempt to enforce them. Still, some puzzles remain. First, if
the guarantees are simply invalid, it is hard to understand why the government needs to keep
telling local governments not to issue them.128 An invalid guarantee is not a problem for the
purported guarantor; it’s a problem for the creditor. The government should be issuing
warnings to creditors not to have faith in such guarantees. Second, both the State Council and
the NAO seem to believe that unlawful government guarantees are nevertheless valid, since
in the 2011 and 2013 NAO reports on local government debt, a category exists (i.e., Type II)
for hard obligations represented by local government guarantees.
Thus, we face essentially the same puzzle here that we examined in the context of direct
debt: if the central government does not want local government guarantees to exist, why not
take the route of consistently refusing to recognize their validity to any degree? Creditors
would rapidly learn to ignore local government promises (or at least to consider them
ephemeral and non-binding). Legal systems that do not wish to see minors bound by
contracts do not in general accomplish this purpose by threatening to punish minors who
enter into contracts. Instead, they simply refuse to enforce such contracts, with the result that
minors who wish to enter into contracts will find no willing counterparty.
Even if local governments did purport to guarantee debt and the guarantee was in some
formal sense legally valid, enforcement would be difficult. First, there are a host of practical
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See, e.g., Ministry of Finance 2010, supra note 27.
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problems to suing a government body in China, especially in a local court whose personnel
appointments and finances are in the hands of the defendant.129 Enterprises and individuals
are considered to be inferior, not equal, to the government. Therefore, the stakes in litigation
against a government body as guarantor will typically go far beyond the issues in a particular
case. In such a legal and social climate, many investors are unlikely to feel comfortable about
bringing suit against a government guarantor. Second, even if a creditor did manage to bring
and win a lawsuit, enforcing the judgment would remain another hurdle.130
Although the literature is replete with warnings about local governments giving formal
(and therefore improper) guarantees, and the above-cited regulations seem to confirm that the
phenomenon is widespread, to our surprise we did not find any such guarantees in the offer
prospectuses we reviewed. In other words, no local governments purported to guarantee
LGFV bond issues in any legally enforceable way.
Can investors take comfort in the informal promises of support? To an extent, that
depends on how much importance a local government places on its reputation for paying its
debts. A problem with reputational sanctions lies in the fact that government officials at any
given time have a high incentive to borrow in order to construct projects that will raise local
GDP, one of the important indices on which their performance is graded.131 By the time the
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Chinese media. See, e.g., Tan Yingzi, Evaluation for Officials Hinges on Public Input, CHINA
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debt becomes due, that official will long ago have left office (possibly having been promoted)
according to the pattern of five-year terms for local officeholders. The successor official may
well be unwilling to honor a non-binding pledge made by and for the benefit of his
predecessor.132
Despite the dubious security offered by government assurances, the number of bond
issues safeguarded by such assurances is the same as the combined number of issues
safeguarded by the other three methods discussed in this paper.
ii. Land use rights as security
Several bond issues put up land use rights (LURs) belonging to the issuer as collateral.133
The legal basis for this form of security is Article 34 of the Guarantee Law of China, which
provides that land use rights that can be legally transferred by the debtor can be used as
collateral.134 “Land use rights” refers to what are in effect long-term (a maximum term of 40,
50, or 70 years, depending on the use) transferable leaseholds in urban land. Although what
amounts to permanent fee simple ownership, and hence the reversion,135 must by law remain

Members in China, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 166, 166-87 (2012), for a review of the academic
literature; the authors conclude from their own research that there is in fact no relation.
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Renqi Nei Yusuan Ying Yueshu Ying Yu Dingfang Zhai Tongbu (任期内预算硬约束应与地方
债同步) [Hard Budget Constraint During Term of Office Should Synchronize with Municipal
Debt], SHANGHAI ZHENGQUAN BAO (上海证券报) [SHANGHAI SEC. NEWS], Oct. 24, 2011,
available at http://bit.ly/1hpZeJf.
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A reversion is the technical term for the interest remaining in the hands of one who grants
to another an interest in land with a shorter term than his own term. For example, if X has a
fee simple (an interest in perpetuity) and grants a 20-year lease to Y in year Z, then X’s
remaining interest (a future interest that ripens to a fee simple in year Z+20) is called the
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with the state, the law allows such land use rights to be granted for a one-time fee. The LURs
then enter the stream of commerce and can be sold, mortgaged, leased, and otherwise
transferred. Land subject to this regime is called “granted land.” Urban land from which
LURs have not yet been carved out and sold is called “allocated land”: someone is using it,
but the user received it through a process of bureaucratic allocation, not via a market
transaction. Allocated LURs are not transferable and cannot be pledged as security—or more
precisely, allocated LURs that are pledged as security will have to be turned into granted
LURs, with the accompanying payment, before they can be taken in satisfaction of the debt
by the secured party.136 In other words, the secured party will end up paying twice: once
when it makes the loan, and once when it takes the security.
In all the prospectuses we examined where LURs were offered as security, the LURs
were in all but one case said to be obtained by grant and are hence unproblematic in that
sense.137 Issuers typically also disclosed that they had already obtained the land use right
certificate from the relevant agency and that the land was free from other encumbrances.
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In the Hami Prospectus, the land-use rights purportedly securing the debt were disclosed
to be so-called “allocated” (huabo) land and hence essentially worthless as security for the
reasons explained above.

It is also worth noting that at the end of 2012, the Ministry of Finance and other
departments issued a joint notice requiring, among other things, that any allocated land
transferred to LGFVs had to be paid for and converted to granted land. See MOF et al. 2012,
supra note 63. The Hami Prospectus states that the parcels in question were acquired in May
2013, and the bonds were not issued until July 2014. Thus, the land-use rights held by the
LGFV in question appear to be in violation of Ministry of Finance rules.
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Offering prospectuses frequently included a detailed schedule of the issuer’s land use rights
used as security, noting the method by which the LURs were obtained and the date.
How good is this security? Although this study does not in the main address the
economic value of the security, there are some aspects of the valuation process that are cause
for concern and can lead to excessive or questionable valuations.138 Although valuations
must be made by credentialed assessors, countless assessment agencies exist in China, with a
wide range of competency and levels of professionalism. LGFVs can freely choose whoever
will give them the highest assessment.
Not all offer prospectuses disclose how the assessor was selected or on what basis the
valuation was made—for example, whether it was made with reference to market value in an
arm’s-length transaction. Although the value of urban land in China has risen greatly since
the mid-1990s,139 there is no way of knowing where it will go in the future.140 In fact, the
market entered a major slump in early 2014.141 However, LGFV issuers still have a tendency
to overvalue the land use rights they have.142
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Ideally, problems of overvaluation should be solved in the bond rating process. China has
a credit rating industry,143 and bond issues are rated. There is reason to believe, however, that
Chinese bond rating agencies may be afflicted by the same problems that afflicted U.S. bond
rating agencies in the run-up to the financial crisis. For example, one prominent firm,
Dagong, downgraded its rating of U.S. government debt to a single A with a negative outlook
in an apparent fit of pique after being denied status as a Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organization by the SEC in 2010.144 At the same time, it gave a higher rating to the
bonds issued by the Loudi LGFV even though the LGFV valued the real estate collateralizing
the debt at prices similar to those of Winnetka, Illinois, where local household income is
about 100 times that of Loudi.145
The significance of valuation problems is compounded by a common feature in the
collateralization agreement: a one-way ratchet. In a number of issues, the issuer has the
obligation to add more LURs as collateral if the value of current collateral falls below some
multiple of the outstanding debt obligation, and the right to demand the release of some
collateral if the value of the collateral is above some multiple of the outstanding debt.146 This
structure could operate as a one-way downward ratchet on the value of collateral on the basis
of two plausible assumptions: first, that land values, even if accurately assessed, can
fluctuate, and second, that the issuer simply may not possess sufficient unencumbered LURs
to provide more collateral when the obligation to do so arises. As a result, if land values go
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up, creditors will lose some collateral, and it may be impossible to recover that collateral
when land values go back down again.
It is sometimes thought that despite valuation problems, LGFV bonds secured by land
use rights at least have something backing them up.147 There may, however, be legal
infirmities in the collateral itself, in addition to problems of economic value.
First, there may be other encumbrances on the LURs used as collateral, and the claims of
bondholders may be inferior.148 The offering prospectuses typically recite that the LURs are
unencumbered, but bondholders have few if any remedies if this assertion turns out not to be
true. The LGFV could be sued for false disclosure, but the disclosure problem will typically
be discovered only at the point when the LGFV is already insolvent. Even if individual
corporate officers can be successfully sued, their personal wealth will be inadequate to make
up actual losses.
Second, the LUR may not have been properly granted.149 In some cases, LURs purport
to be granted by the governing entity of a development zone, called a Development Zone
Commission. But such commissions have no legal power to grant LURs; that belongs to the
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local municipal government.150 In other cases, the land may still be in the intermediate stage
prior to being formally granted, when existing residents are being cleared off and various
payments must be made.151 It should be noted that these are generic problems with the use of
LURs as collateral; we did not find specific evidence of these problems in any of the offering
prospectuses we reviewed.
A more serious problem with the grant lies in the possibility that no grant fee was ever
paid. Consider the mathematics, taking the Loudi Prospectus as an example. The bond issue
proposed to raise 1.2 billion yuan. The prospectus, dated January 2011, states that the value
of the LURs securing the bonds is approximately 2.1 billion yuan. Most of the LURs were
granted just one year earlier, in 2010. Even if the LGFV got the LURs at a 50% discount to
the market value of just a year later—a generous assumption—it should have paid just over 1
billion yuan for them. This leads to an obvious question: if it had enough cash to pay for
LURs, why did it need to raise cash through a bond issue?
The obvious answer is that it did not have the cash and probably paid for the LURs with
an IOU. But Chinese law requires full payment for LURs before LURs can be transferred,
and a transfer is involved when a creditor realizes on collateral.152 Even where the local
government is the sole shareholder of the LGFV, whether it can inject LURs as a capital
contribution (taking payment in stock of the LGFV) is not clear.
In short, there are strong reasons to doubt that the LURs securing LGFV bonds have
been paid for in full. Without full payment, they cannot be transferred and are useless to
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creditors. And when the LGFV is insolvent—precisely the time when creditors need the
collateral—it is of course in no position to pay for the LURs.
Similarly, Article 39 of the Law on Urban Real Estate Administration requires that LUR
grantees take certain steps to develop the land before it can be transferred. One rule is that the
development be undertaken in accordance with the terms of the contract. Since the local
government, the sole shareholder of the LGFV, is on the other side of the contract, one could
reasonably expect the terms not to be onerous. But there is another rule not so easily avoided:
the requirement that 25% of planned investment in housing have been made before the LUR
can be transferred. As many of the LURs are stated to be for housing purposes, this
requirement cannot be avoided. Failure to make planned investment can even make the
original grant contract void.153
In an extreme case, validly-granted LURs can be voided entirely when the fee is not paid
according to the terms of the contract.154
A final consideration is that even if the legal and economic status of the security is sound,
realizing on it may prove difficult if it requires displacing existing residents.155 They may not
be willing to go peacefully. Given that defaults are likely to occur in a time of general
economic downturn and therefore with a higher potential for social unrest, it is very unlikely
that government authorities would place a higher priority on protecting the legal rights of
distant bondholders than on preventing demonstrations and other manifestations of social
unrest.
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There can be little doubt that many of these infirmities exist. Several were noted with
disapproval in a document jointly issued in late 2012 by several central government
regulators.156 Current disclosure practices vary. In the Shaoyang and Loudi offer
prospectuses, the disclosure is quite comprehensive. It includes the exact location, the size,
and expiration dates of the LURs, whether there are encumbrances, and the nature of those
encumbrances.157 Other issuers disclose only basic data about the location and value of the
LURs, without addressing more critical concerns, such as the way the LUR was obtained and
information about encumbrances.158 In any case, it is impossible to tell from the prospectuses
what agreements have been made about land development and whether the LGFVs are in a
position to undertake necessary development of the LURs being offered as collateral. The
point here is simply that what appears to be and may in fact be a valid, top-priority LUR in an
accurately-assessed parcel of real estate can still bear hidden dangers that call for constant
monitoring.
iii. Future receivables as security
Several bond issues purport to be secured by receivables due to the LGFV issuer under
BT (Build-Transfer) agreements between the issuer and certain local governmental agencies
(usually the agencies in charge of finance, transportation, or construction) in which the issuer
agrees to build a project and the agency agrees to purchase the project after it has been
built.159 Interestingly, this structure seems to be legally robust, even though in substance it
mimics a forbidden structure.
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As discussed above, if a local government wishes to finance a construction project, it
may not do so by issuing bonds directly. Nor may it guarantee bonds issued by its whollyowned LGFV.160 Obviously, an LGFV may issue bonds on its own, but the trick is to have
the local government give a legally binding commitment of its own to bondholders in the face
of the above prohibitions.
The pledge of receivables accomplishes this goal neatly. First, the issue of bonds by the
LGFV is legally unproblematic, precisely because the LGFV is not a government entity.
Second, the contractual commitment by the local government to purchase the project upon
completion under the BT contract is also unproblematic.161 Governments and government
agencies can commit themselves contractually to suppliers under ordinary principles of
government procurement. Third, the pledge of the receivable, which gives bondholders
priority over other creditors of the LGFV, is permitted under China’s Guarantee Law.
As a result, bondholders get exactly what they would get if the local government issued
the bonds directly or provided a guarantee for LGFV bonds (assuming either was legal): a
legally valid government promise to pay money sufficient to repay the bonds and to which
they have top-priority access. Needless to say, whether the local government will actually
have the funds to make good on its promise to pay is an important issue, but the focus of this
article is on the legal status of the various safeguards for repayment available to bondholders.
iv. Third party business entity as guarantor
Another commonly used safeguard in LGFV bonds is a guarantee from a third party
business entity. The third party company can be either an investment holding company or a
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company specializing in the guarantee business. For example, in the Baoji LGFV bond,
China National Investment and Guaranty Co. Ltd. acted as the guarantor for the bonds,
providing a “full, unconditional, and irrevocable joint responsibility guarantee.”162 In the
Leshan LGFV bond, the two classes of bonds were guaranteed respectively by Chongqing
Three Gorges Guarantee Group Co. Ltd. and Beijing Capital Investment and Guarantee Co.
Ltd. Respectively, and the guarantors provided a “full, unconditional, and irrevocable joint
responsibility guarantee”.163 In a bond issuance by Mega Advance Investments Limited
(“Mega”), a Beijing LGFV, the guarantor company promised to “irrevocably and
unconditionally guarantee the due and punctual payment of the principal of and interest on,
and all other amounts payable under, the Notes when and as the same shall become due and
payable.”164 Furthermore, the guarantor agreed that its obligations under the guarantees
would be “as if it were principal obligor and not merely surety”.165
Under Chinese law, a guarantee provided by a third party that can be independently held
liable for the debt is a form of security under the Guarantee Law.166 Specifically here, the
bonds are secured by the guaranteeing entity’s operating assets that can be legally transferred
or disposed of in order to pay off the debt of the LGFV under the guarantee agreement signed
between LGFV and the guarantee company. Accordingly, the disclosure in the prospectus
involves material information about the guarantor company instead of the LGFV issuer, with
the guarantor company’s income-generating operations and assets constituting the bulk of the
disclosure, as in the case of the Mega bond issuance.
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A common type of third-party guarantor is a specialized guarantee company; as of the
end of 2011, China had 8,402 of them, with assets purporting to total 931 billion yuan.167
Guarantees from such companies can, however, be very risky. Guarantee companies were
originally created with the backing of local governments to help small and medium
enterprises get bank loans.168 Banks normally prefer to lend to enterprises that have hard
assets such as land or else have implicit state backing. Guarantee companies charge
borrowers a fee and then provide a binding guarantee to the lending bank. In effect, then, the
guarantee company offers default insurance, with the premium paid by the borrower.
This means that the lender has to consider a number of things about the insurer. How
many policies does it have outstanding, and how do its potential obligations match up against
its assets? Even if that information is fully disclosed—and often it is not—the lender still
needs to know how many more policies it will issue after the loan is made. Most importantly,
one can have confidence in one’s insurer only if one is confident that the insurer’s risks on its
various policies are not positively correlated with each other.169 In other words, if it is
insuring one party against a default that will happen if the price of oil goes up, it should be
insuring another party against a default in the same amount that will happen if the price of oil
goes down. You do not want a flood insurer that does business only in New Orleans.
Whether Chinese guarantee companies have in fact spread their risks properly is far from
clear, and in any case not evident from the disclosure provided in bond prospectuses. Thus, it
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is very possible that they are vulnerable to broad economic shocks that hit all or most
borrowers at once, such as a downturn in the property market or a significant slowing of
growth.
The risks of guarantee companies were vividly brought home in the 2012 collapse of the
Zhongdan Investment Credit Guarantee Company.170 In January 2012, banks reacted to
rumors of a liquidity crunch at Zhongdan by calling loans. The debtor companies in turn
sought help from Zhongdan, but the volume of loans overwhelmed the company. Zhongdan
had guaranteed 3.3 billion yuan in loans, but had only five million yuan immediately liquid
and accessible when the calls for funds came. In the case of Zhongdan, there appears to have
been malfeasance afoot. But even without malfeasance, the lack of real substance to its
guarantees is likely duplicated at many other guarantee companies.
An important aspect of due diligence for bond holders is to examine carefully the assets
and liabilities of the guarantor companies. The assets of guarantor companies may be
misstated or subject to multiple existing encumbrances.171 When the bulk of a guarantor
company’s assets are its subsidiaries, it is critical to know about the indebtedness of those
subsidiaries, ranging from convertible bonds to bank loans.172
Even if the guarantor company had no encumbrances or indebtedness, its asset structure
could be problematic because of a high ratio of non-liquid assets to liquid assets such as cash.
For example, in the Mega LGFV bond issue, the guarantee company’s portfolio assets
include natural gas distribution and transmission assets, brewery operations, sewage and
water treatment facilities and concessions, and expressways and toll roads. For the guarantee
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company in the Baoji LGFV bond issuance, China National Investment & Guarantee Co.,
Ltd., the ratio of non-liquid assets to liquid assets is approximately 4:5.173 Its non-liquid
assets include “sellable financial assets” and fixed assets.174 It is by definition difficult to
cash out non-liquid assets when the debt obligation is due, and that difficulty undermines the
value of the guarantee as security.
4. The Debt Swap Program
In the spring of 2015, the government announced a program under which local
governments could issue bonds. Under the plan, known as a debt swap, the Ministry of
Finance would, in separate tranches of quotas, authorize local governments at the level of
province and separately-planned city175 to issue bonds, the revenues from which would be
used to pay off local government debt. The purpose of the plan is to allow local governments
to save on interest costs by replacing short-term, high-cost, high-risk local government debt
(including LGFV debt that is classed as local government debt) with longer-term, lower-risk
and therefore lower-cost government bond debt.176
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See BAOJI PROSPECTUS, at 73.
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See id.; see also Qiye Zhunze Di 22 Hao: Jinrong Gongju Queren He Jiliang (企业会计
准则第 22 号－－金融工具确认和计量) [Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 22 Recognition and Measurement of Financial Instruments] (promulgated by Ministry of
Finance, Feb. 15, 2006, effective Feb. 15, 2006) art. 18, chapter I, available at
http://bit.ly/y0NvbO (China) (defining “sellable financial assets”).
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The Chinese term is jihua danlie shi: a city separately listed under the state plan. The idea
is simply that of a city sufficiently large and important to be treated as a province for
economic planning purposes. Although the scope of economic planning has declined
drastically in post-Mao China, the category of “separately-planned city” remains when it is
desired for whatever reason to include large cities within the scope of activities generally
reserved for provinces.
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See Du, supra note 6, Chen Jia, Expand Local Debt-Swap Plan to Further Reduce
Burden, Says Official, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 22, 2015. For a detailed analysis, see Barry
Naughton, Local Debt Restructuring: A Case of Ongoing Authoritarian Reform, CHINA
LEADERSHIP MONITOR, no. 47 (Summer 2015), http://hvr.co/1QBWqUu.
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The first tranche of the swap was one trillion yuan and was to cover obligations
(probably only Type I obligations) of local governments identified in the 2013 NAO report
that were due in 2015.177 According to the Ministry of Finance, the one trillion yuan quota
covered 53.8% of the 1.86 trillion yuan in debts that came due in 2015, and a proportional
allocation system meant that each province received a quota representing 53.8% of its direct
indebtedness.178
The second tranche, also of one trillion yuan, was announced in June 2015.179 That
additional quota was also intended to cover debts coming due in 2015. Since each tranche
amounts to over 50% of the debt it is to cover, together they would seem to cover more than
the debt in question. In any case, the quota for 2015 was ultimately raised to 3.2 billion yuan,
of which 3.18 trillion yuan in swapped bonds was used by mid-December.180 Estimates of
the amount needed to absorb remaining LGFV debt range from 11 to 25 trillion yuan.181
Although the Ministry of Finance announced that revenues from the swapped bonds
could not be used to pay off debts that should be paid from the self-generated revenues of
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enterprises and institutions, there is wiggle room here: as discussed above, since the
distinctions used by the NAO to determine precisely which debts are this kind of debt are not
strict legal ones, it is not going to be self-evident which local debts “should” be payable
solely from self-generated revenues of enterprises and institutions.
The swap program is part of a larger central government effort to clean up LGFV debt
and reduce or eliminate its use in the future. It is not, however, going to make the issues
surrounding LGFV debt discussed in this article disappear. First, although we cannot know
exactly the criteria used by the NAO is classifying debt associated with local governments, it
seems beyond doubt that a considerable amount of LGFV debt is Type II or Type III debt, or
possibly not even counted as local government debt at all, whereas the swap program seems
to cover only Type I debt.182 Second, since the very category of “LGFV” is not a legal or
precisely-defined one, the only way to effectively ban LGFV debt is to ban all debt in
corporate entities owned by local governments. But the government has not gone this far. If it
is ever more convenient for local governments to borrow through establishing wholly-owned
companies instead of directly in their own name, we will see LGFVs or their functional
equivalent.
5. Conclusion
The contribution of LGFVs to China’s economy will probably always remain
controversial. On the one hand, they were a key element in the government’s post-financialcrisis stimulus plan, which relied heavily on bank lending and relatively little on new
government spending.183 They allowed local governments to get capital for infrastructure
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The definitions of these categories of debt are discussed in Part 3.a.ii supra.
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See Supporting China’s Infrastructure Stimulus Under the INFRA Platform, INFRA
UPDATE, (World Bank), June 2010, available at http://bit.ly/1Libfx6 (“[O]nly a small part of
the stimulus was reflected in the central government’s budget. Additional financing—largely
bank lending—contributed almost two-thirds of the stimulus.”); Yu Yongding, China’s
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construction, and enabled China’s GDP to continue to grow. On the other hand, the only
reason local governments needed LGFVs to raise capital was that the central government
prohibited them from borrowing themselves—a policy that could have been changed
whenever necessary, and that is now being relaxed (although only down to the level of the
province and separately-planned cities).184 It is not clear whether the infrastructure financed
through LGFVs has in fact made China better off, since there is reason to believe that at least
some of it is unlikely to produce an economic return over its cost. GDP grows whenever there
is more economic activity than before, but not all economic activity—for example, the classic
case of digging a hole and filling it up again—represents a good investment and leads to
growth. It can retard growth if it just produces bad debt that must be ultimately borne by
households, thus in turn leading to lower aggregate demand.
Because it seems almost mathematically certain that at least some non-trivial number of
LGFV bonds will not be eligible for the swap program and will default, it is necessary to
think about the quality of the security they offer. It is difficult to generalize about bond
repayment safeguards because of the variety of practices we have canvassed. As we have

Response to the Global Financial Crisis, EAST ASIA FORUM (Jan. 25, 2010),
http://bit.ly/1J7j7js (“The central government is financing one-quarter of the 4 trillion yuan
package, in the form of direct grants and interest rate subsidies. Bank credit is the second
most important source of finance for the stimulus package.”).
184

Although Article 35 of the 2015 Budget Law reserves bond-issuing powers at the subcentral level to provincial-level governments, see infra note 36 and accompanying text, the
Ministry of Finance in 2015 interpreted this to include separately-planned cities. See, e.g.,
Difang Zhengfu Yiban Zhaiquan Faxing Guanli Zanxing Banfa (地方政府一般债券发行管
理暂行办法) [Interim Measures for the Administration of the Issuance of Ordinary Bonds by
Local Governments] (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, March 12, 2015, effective
March 12, 2015), available at http://bit.ly/1Fa8uXz (China). (The concept of separatelyplanned cities is explained in note 175 supra.) More recently, it expanded its interpretation
still further to include Free Trade Zones. See Guanyu Zuohao 2016 Nian Difang Zhengfu
Zhaiquan Faxing Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于做好 2016 年地方政府债券发行工作的通知)
[Notice on Doing Well the Work of Issuance of Local Government Bonds in 2016], sec. 6,
para. 2. The legal implications of this apparent disregard for a clear statutory rule are beyond
the scope of this article.
57

discussed, a government guarantee is not a valid security in Chinese law, either in theory or in
practice, no matter what the bond prospectuses might say. On the other hand, the land use
right obtained by grant, as well as the guarantee provided by a guarantee company,
constitutes a valid security interest, although its economic value requires separate analysis.
This article’s analysis of the legal structure of LGFV bonds and local government debt
more generally also has important lessons for understanding the Chinese legal system as a
whole. A key part of the story of local government indebtedness is the inadequacy of legal
categories to understand what is going on. Legal terms of art such as “debt,” “liability,” and
“guarantee” are widely used, and yet it becomes quickly apparent that they are not being used
in a legal sense. This means that data classified using these terms cannot be readily compared
with data classified using these terms in other countries.
In particular, it is clear that accounts of the level of China’s local government debt that
include Type II and Type III debt simply cannot be accepted at face value. This is not debt
that local governments have any actual obligation to pay. To be sure, they may wish to pay
creditors voluntarily and may from time to time do so, but soft obligations of this nature have
never been considered debt in China or in other countries, and it is misleading to label them
as such. Creditors who have tried to force local governments to make good on their
guarantees have uniformly failed. At most they have received half of what they sought, under
a legal theory that a recent Supreme People’s Court case has made more difficult to invoke.185
The argument that local governments have some politically (even if not legally) enforceable
obligation to pay on their guarantees does not seem supported by the evidence.
In addition, we see here what can be observed in other areas of Chinese law as well: the
tendency of some players and institutions in the system to recognize as legally valid acts that
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at the same time the system deplores and even prohibits.186 The system could attempt to
discourage unlawful borrowing and guarantee-issuing by local governments by simply
making such borrowing and guarantees legally invalid and unenforceable—in effect, invisible
to the legal system. And in a sense it tries to do that, but not unambiguously. Its approach is
instead to prohibit the acts and make them punishable, implicitly conceding that the act could
be effective.
For the state to prohibit and punish murder makes sense, because the murderer does not
need the state’s help to make the murder effective. But to prohibit and punish the making of
guarantees is different, because without the state’s cooperation the guarantee could not be
effective and could do no damage in the first place. On the one hand, the courts are
invalidating local government guarantees. But at the same time, instead of warning creditors
not to accept such guarantees, the central government is warning local governments not to
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One can often see this phenomenon in real estate transactions. Consider the following
report:
In the Hongshan district of Wuhan City, 927 mu of collective mountain and forest land was sold
illegally four times in succession, producing a profit for the work units and people involved of over
40 million RMB. A budget audit of the State Food and Drug Supervision and Management Bureau
revealed that in December 2003, the organization services department of that bureau signed, without
any authority, a contract with two companies to sell for 85 million RMB 216 mu of land in the
Chanping District, Beijing. The companies were to use the land for running a business and
development. That land had been provided to the Bureau without cost by the State. This land sale was
not reported to the departments concerned for approval. This was done without any of the required
legal procedures in violation of the Land Management Law and the regulations issued by the State
Council to bring order into the real estate market. After the audit, the Bureau took the matter seriously
and is now studying how to rectify the matter.

Li Jinhua (李金华) [Director, National Audit Office], Guanyu 2003 niandu zhongyang
yusuan zhixing he qita caizheng shouzhi de shenji gongzuo baogao (关于 2003 年度中央预
算执行和其他财政收支的审计工作报告) [Audit Report on the Implementation and
Financial Receipts and Expenditures of the 2003 Central Budget], June 24, 2004, available at
http://bit.ly/lijinhua (Internet archive site) (translation courtesy of David Cowhig). One way
of rectifying the matter would simply be to refuse to recognize the sale, and to support the reoccupation of the land by whoever had the right to it before the sale. Buyers in illegal
transactions would quickly learn their lesson and insist that legal procedures be followed
before parting with their money. But that apparently is not a step the authorities were willing
to take.
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make them, and the State Council and the NAO categorize them as valid and enforceable
when they count local government debt obligations. The broader lesson here is that acts that
are prohibited under Chinese law cannot be assumed to be invalid even if they require state
cooperation to be valid; they may or may not be, and a detailed analysis of the specific act in
question, and related rules and practices, is required.
There is no question that LGFV defaults will pose a challenge for China’s political
system. The pressure for bailouts will be intense, but the cost of providing them, in terms of
both actual money and added moral hazard, will be huge. Yet defaults will also pose a serious
challenge to China’s legal system. If defaulting LGFVs are not bailed out, then the cost of
default must land somewhere other than on the entity—probably the central government,
perhaps the local government—that would have funded the bailout. There are legal rules
about where it ought to land. Will they be effective? A great natural experiment is in the
offing.
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